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Abstract: The paper using a three-sector general equilibrium model with agricultural dualism and
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the problem of child labour in a developing economy although they raise the non-child labour
income of the poor households. A policy of capital led growth through inflows of foreign capital,
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1. Introduction
The incidence of child labour is one of the most disconcerting problems in the transitional
societies of developing economies. According to ILO (2002), one in every six children aged
between 5 and 17 - or 246 million children are involved in child labour.1 If the “invisible”
workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that the estimates would
shoot up significantly further.
Available empirical evidences suggest that the concentration of child labour is the highest in the
rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is used intensively directly or
indirectly in the agricultural sector2. In backward agriculture, the production techniques are
primitive, use of capital is very low and child labour can almost do whatever adult labour does.
Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by using bullocks and ploughs and the cattle-
feeding is entirely done by child labour. Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest
children are often used in the family farms for helping adult members of the family. The
advanced agricultural sector on the other hand uses mechanised techniques of production and
uses agricultural machineries like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. and
therefore does not require child labour in its production process. This type of agricultural dualism
is a very common feature of the developing countries. The distinction between advanced and
backward agriculture can be made on the basis of inputs used, economies of scale, efficiency and
elasticity of substitution between different factors of production.
1
 Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous works.
Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour including slavery,
trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced recruitment for armed conflict,
prostitution, pornography and other illicit activities (ILO, June 2002).
2 According to the ILO (2002) report (figure 4, pp. 36), more than 70 per cent of economically
active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors.
3The existing theoretical literature on child labour3, however, has not paid any attention as yet to
agricultural dualism and its implications on the problem of child labour. This is important
because from the view point of the use of child labour, these two types of agricultural sectors
differ and any changes in their output composition will affect the magnitude of child labour use in
the agricultural sector. Agriculture in many countries is supported by government’s subsidy
policies in the form of price support, export subsidy, credit support etc.  In a developing country
like India, farmers in backward agriculture are given price support with a view to protect
themselves from sharp fall in their product prices during the times of over supply in the market.
Government’s Minimum Support Price mechanism is a very common form of government
subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture. These types of subsidy schemes are
designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population who are the potential suppliers
of child labour. It is therefore natural to expect that these fiscal measures will raise the earning
opportunities of the poor households which in turn will lower the supply of child labour by these
families through positive income effect. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it
appears to be at the first sight. This is because apart from their impact on adult wages, these
policies affect the output composition of different sectors and the earning opportunities of
children as well. An expansion of backward agriculture resulting from a price subsidy policy to
that sector, for example, will result in a higher demand for child labour and raise the use of child
labour in the economy. Even if there is a positive income effect due to increase in adult wages,
the net effect on child labour may be perverse. Any policy effect on the child labour incidence
should, therefore, be carried out in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework so as to capture
various linkages that may exist in the system.
The present paper is designed to examine the consequences of different agricultural subsidy
policies on the child labour incidence in a developing economy in terms of a three-sector full-
employment general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. We consider a
three-sector full-employment model with child labour. The economy is divided into two
agricultural and one manufacturing sectors. One of the two agricultural sectors is backward
agriculture (sector 2) that uses child labour. In this set-up we have examined the consequence of a
3 See Basu an Van (1998), Basu (1999), Gupta (2000, 2002), Jaferey and Lahiri (2002), Ranjan
(1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Chaudhuri (2010), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006,
2007), Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour
has been attributed to factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality
of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximize
present income etc.
4price subsidy policy designed to benefit backward agriculture and the poorer section of the
working population on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. Our analysis finds
that a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture is very likely to produce a perverse effect on
the child labour incidence. On the contrary, a policy of growth with foreign capital will be
effective in lessening the gravity of the child labour problem. The results obtained in the paper
can at least question the desirability of assisting backward agriculture so as to eradicate the
problem of child labour in the society.
2. The model
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two agricultural and one manufacturing.
Sector 1 is the advanced agricultural sector that produces its output, 1X , by means of adult
labour ( )L , land ( )N  and capital ( )K . Capital used in this sector includes both physical capital
like tractors and harvesters and working capital required for purchasing material inputs like
fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. The other agricultural sector, we call it backward
agriculture (sector 2), produces its output, 2X , using adult and child labour ( )CL  and land. Sector
2 does not require capital for its production. The land-output ratios in sectors 1, and 2
( 1Na and 2Na ) are assumed to be technologically given. This assumption can be defended as
follows. In one hectare of land the number of saplings that can be sown is given. There should be
a minimum gap between two saplings and land cannot be substituted by other factors of
production. Besides, empirical evidence from developing countries, like India, suggests that the
productivity per hectare of land has remained more or less unchanged over a long period of time.4
It is sensible to assume that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-intensive vis-à-







where sjia are input-output ratios. Available empirical evidence suggests that the concentration of
4
 In case of India, per hectare wheat production was 2708 kg in 2000-01 and it remained at 2708
kg per hectare even for the year 2006-07. Besides, per hectare food grains production was 1734
kg in 2001-02 and the corresponding figure for the year 2006-07 was 1756 kg indicating fairly
constant land-output ratio.
5child labour is the highest in the rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is
used intensively directly or indirectly in backward agriculture that uses primitive production
techniques. The advanced agricultural sector, on the other hand, uses mechanised techniques of
production and does not require child labour in production. Child labour is therefore specific to
backward agriculture. The two agricultural sectors are the two informal sectors in the sense that
the adult workers receive competitive wage,W , and these are the two export sectors of the
economy. The formal sector (sector 3) is the import-competing sector that produces a
manufacturing commodity, 3X using adult labour and capital. The formal sector faces a unionised
labour market where workers receive a contractual wage W withW W . The adult labour
allocation mechanism is as follows. Adult workers first try to get employment in the formal sector
that offers the higher wage and those who are unable to find employment in the said sector are
automatically absorbed in the two agricultural sectors, as the wage rate there is perfectly flexible.
Capital is completely mobile between sectors 1 and 3. Owing to the small open economy
assumption all the three commodity prices , s,iP  are given internationally. Competitive markets,
excepting the formal sector labour market, constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies with
positive and diminishing marginal productivities of inputs5 and full-employment of resources are
assumed. Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following three equations present the zero-profit conditions relating to the three
sectors of the economy.
1 1 1 1L N KWa Ra ra   (1)
2 2 2 2 (1 )L C C N PWa W a Ra P S         (2)
3 3 3L KWa ra P   (3)
where R , r and CW  stand for return to land, return to capital and child wage rate, respectively.
PS stands for the rate of ad-valorem price subsidy given to backward agriculture.
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following four
equations, respectively.
LXaXaXa LLL  332211                     (4)
5 The land-output ratios in the two agricultural sectors ( 1Na and 2Na ) have been assumed to be
technologically given. However, the other inputs exhibit CRS between themselves.
6KXaXa KK  3311 (5)
NXaXa NN  2211  (6)
CC LXa 22    (7)
While endowments of adult labour, land and capital6 are fixed in the economy, the aggregate
supply of child labour, CL , is endogenously determined from the utility maximizing behavior of
the households.
2.1. Household behaviour
We derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing behaviour of the
representative altruistic poor household. There are L numbers of working families, which are
classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. The adult workers
who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer section of the
working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the informal agricultural
sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and theoretical reason
for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children to work out of sheer
poverty.  Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’7 of Basu and Van (1998), we assume that there exists a
critical level of family (or adult labour) income, *W , such that the parents will send their
children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We
assume that each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income,W , sufficiently
higher than this critical level8. So, the workers of the formal sector do not send their children to
6
  The capital endowment of the economy may, however, increase in the presence of foreign
direct investment (FDI).
7
 Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes
(Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury
Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving
force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical
level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as
poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his
children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty.
8 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that
0Cl   if (1 ) Cn WW 
 .
7work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in the two agricultural sectors earn W amount
of wage income (we assume that this is their only source of income excluding income from child
labour), which is less than the critical wage , *W , and therefore send some of their children to the
job market to supplement low family income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital-
owners and land-owners are separate classes and they do not supply any child labour.9
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family (all assumed to be identical) is
determined from the utility maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household who
works as wage labour in any of the agricultural sectors. We assume that each working family
consists of one adult member and ‘n’ number of children. The altruistic adult member of the
family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent to the workplace ( )Cl . The utility
function of the household is given by
))(,,,( 321 ClnCCCUU 
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, iC s and from the
children’s leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of
the utility function.
 )()()()( 321 ClnCCCAU                                                                                               (8)
with 0A , 0,,,1   ; and, .1)(  
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint.
)(332211 WlWCPCPCP CC                                     (9)
where, W is the income of the adult worker and CC lW measures the income from child labour.
Maximizing the utility function with respect to its arguments and subject to the above budget
constraint and solving for Cl the following family child labour supply function can be derived.
10
9 Alternatively, one can assume that rental incomes are equally divided among the L number of
working families. Consequently, share of rental incomes enters into the household maximization
exercise.
10
 See Appendix I for mathematical derivation.
8{(1 ) ( / )}C Cl n W W                                                                                                           (10)
From (10) it is easy to check that Cl varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in
W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his
children and therefore decides to send a fewer number of children to the workplace. An increase
in CW , on the other hand, implies increased opportunity cost of leisure and therefore produces a
negative substitution effect, which increases the supply of child labour from each family.11
In our model there are )( 33 XaLL LI   number of adult workers engaged in the two informal
sectors and each of them sends Cl  number of children to the workplace. Thus, the aggregate
supply function of child labour in the economy is given by
3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C LL n W W L a X     (11)
2.2. The General Equilibrium Analysis
Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as
2 2 3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C La X n W W L a X             (7.1)
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) – (6), (7.1) and
(11). There are eight endogenous variables in the system: 1 2 3, , , , , ,CW W R r X X X and CL and the
same number of independent equations (namely equations (1)  (6), (7.1) and (11). The
parameters in the system are: 2 3, , , , , , , , , ,P P L K N W n    and PS . Equations (1)  (3)
constitute the price system. This is an indecomposable system with three price equations and four
factor prices, , ,CW W r and R . So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor
endowments. Given the child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a modified
Heckscher-Ohlin system as they use both adult unskilled labour and land in their production.
Given the world prices and the unionised wage W , r is determined from equation (3). Now
11
 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply
function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.
91 2, , , ,CW W R X X  and 3X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1).
Finally, CL is determined from (11).
3. Comparative Statics
As discussed earlier agriculture in many countries, especially backward agriculture in developing
countries is supported by different subsidies of the government. The primary objective of such a
fiscal support is poverty alleviation. As these policies are designed to benefit the poorer section of
the working population, conventional wisdom suggests that these measures will raise the adult
income of the poor households which in turn will put a brake on the problem of child labour in
the society. This section is aimed at examining the efficacy of a price subsidy policy in mitigating
the child labour problem in the economy.
For determining the consequences of the price subsidy policy to backward agriculture on factor
prices and output composition after totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) –(6) and (7.1) and
solving by Cramer’s rule we can establish the following proposition12.
Proposition 1: A price subsidy policy to backward agriculture leads to (i) increases in both
adult wage,W , and child wage, CW ; (ii) a fall in the )/( CWW  ratio and an expansion (a
contraction) of the backward (advanced) agricultural sector. The formal manufacturing sector
contracts if 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    ⁯13.
12 See Appendix II for detailed derivations.
13
 Here kjiS is the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector
with 0kjiS for ij  ; and, 0kjjS  while ji is the allocative share of j th input in i th sector.
Besides, 12 1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNL        as the backward agriculture (sector 2) is more adult
labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agriculture (sector 1) with respect to land.
10
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r  is determined
from the zero-profit condition for sector 3 (equation (3)) and remains unchanged despite a change
in PS , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified Hechscher-Ohlin
subsystem (MHOSS) because they use two common inputs: adults labour and land. The
modification is due to the fact that apart from adult labour and land sector 2 uses child labour and
sector 1 uses capital as inputs.  An increase in PS that raises the effective producer price of
commodity 2 lowers the rate of return to land, R  and raises the adult wage, W following a
Stolper-Samuelson type  effect, as sector 2 is more adult labour-intensive than sector 1 with
respect to land. As adult wage rate increases producers in sector 1 substitute adult labour by
capital while their counterparts in sector 2 substitute adult labour by child labour. As the adult
labour-output ratios ( 1La and 2La ) in the two agricultural sectors fall the availability of adult
labour to the MHOSS rises that in turn produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on
sector 2 (sector 1) following a Rybczynski type effect. As backward agriculture expands the
demand for child labour increases as child labour is specific to that sector. This raises the child
wage rate ( CW ). As both W and CW increase there would be two opposite effects on the supply of
child labour by each poor working families. It is easy to check that the proportionate increase in
child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that )/( CWW falls14. What happens to sector
3 will be determined by movement of capital between sector 1 and sector 3. As adult wage rate
increases, with given rate of interest and constant land coefficient, wage-rental ratio in the
advanced agricultural sector increases and producers in sector 1 substitute adult labour by capital
resulting in an increase in 1Ka . But as sector 1 has contracted the net effect on the use of capital in
this sector is ambiguous. However, it can be proved that use of capital increases (decreases) in
sector 1 (sector 3) under the sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    . Consequently,
sector 3 contracts.15
14 This result is consistent with specific factor models. For an understanding of how return to
inter sectoral mobile factor and specific factors reacts to change in relative commodity prices, one
can go through Jones (1971). See Appendix II for mathematical proof.
15 Note that the capital-output ratio in sector 3 ( 3Ka ) is given as r does not change.
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3.1 Price subsidy to backward agriculture and incidence of child labour
For examining the implications of the subsidy policies on the incidence of child labour in the
economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by equation (11). We
note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the
size of the informal sector adult labour force, )( 33 XaLL LI  , as these families are considered
to be the suppliers of child labour; and, (ii) through a change in Cl (the number of child workers
supplied by each poor family), which results from a change in the ( / )CW W ratio. Differentiating
equation (11) the following proposition can be proved.16
Proposition 2: A price subsidy policy directed towards backward agricultural sector will
worsen the problem of child labour in the economy either if 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    ; or if,
2 1 2 1
LC KL CC LLS S S S .
As explained previously, a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture lowers the
)/( CWW ratio, which in turn increases the supply of child labour from each poor working family.
On the other hand, as the formal sector contracts in terms of output and employment (under the
sufficient condition mentioned earlier) the number of poor working families, which are
considered to be the suppliers of child labour, )( 33 XaL L , increases.   So, we have a situation
where there are more poor families each supplying an increased number on child worker.
Therefore, a price subsidy to backward agriculture aggravates the problem of child labour in the
society.
4. Quest for alternative policies
What alternative policies this theoretical analysis recommends in combating the problem of child
labour is the crucial question the answer to which the present section attempts to provide. We
have already demonstrated that a policy which only targets the supply side of the child labour
16 This has been derived in Appendix IV.
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problem may not be effective in mitigating the prevalence of the evil in the system. This is
because a policy that encourages backward agriculture to grow does not only increase the non-
child labour income (adult income) but also boosts up the demand for child labour. A policy that
addresses the demand side of the problem is likely to be effective under the given circumstances.
Mechanized farming should be encouraged that lowers the demand for child labour. One such
alternative policy could be growth with foreign capital. To capture the effects of foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows17 totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1) and solving
by Cramer’s rule we get the following result18.
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) an increase in adult wage,W ; (ii) a
fall in  child wage, CW ; (iii) an increase in the )/( CWW  ratio; and, (iv) and an expansion (a
contraction) of the advanced (backward) agricultural sector. The formal manufacturing sector also
expands owing to capital inflows.
An FDI inflow raises the capital stock of the economy. But the rate of return to capital does not
change as it is determined from equation (3). Both the capital using sectors i.e. sector 1 and sector
3 expand.19 This raises the demand for adult labour. Consequently, the adult informal wage,W ,
rises. This lowers the return to land, R (see equation (1)). For supplying additional land required
for expansion of sector 1, sector 2 has to contract. The contracting backward agriculture (sector 2)
also supplies the extra adult labour to the expanding other two sectors. The demand for child
labour goes down that lowers the child wage rate, CW . AsW rises and CW  falls the relative adult
wage )/( CWW increases unambiguously20 which in turn lowers the supply of child labour by
each poor working household. On the other hand, as the formal sector (sector 3) has expanded
both in terms of output and employment the number of poor working families engaged in the two
agricultural sectors falls.   So, we have a situation where there are fewer potential child labour
supplying families with each of them sending a fewer number of children to workplace. Thus,
17
 Here foreign capital and domestic capital have been assumed to be perfect substitutes.
18 For mathematical derivations see Appendices II and III.
19
 See Appendix III.
20
 See Appendix II.
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both the forces work together and result in an unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply of child
labour in the society.
It is worthwhile in this connection to point out that a policy of subsidizing/encouraging advanced
agriculture in the form of a price and/or a credit subsidy will also be effective in lessening the
child labour incidence but that will be at the cost of lowering the adult wage rate. Looking at the
price system (equations (1) – (3)) it is easy to find that a price and/or a credit subsidy to advanced
agriculture effectively raises the relative price of commodity 1. That produces a Stolper-
Samuelson effect in the MHOSS that results in an increase the return to land, R  and a decrease in
the adult wage, W  as sector 1 is more land-intensive  relative to sector 2 with respect to adult
labour. This produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2). As sector 2
contracts the demand for child labour goes down as this is specific to this sector. Consequently,
the child wage rate falls. It is easy to check that the proportionate fall in child wage rate is greater
than that in adult wage so that )/( CWW rises. This lowers the supply of child labour by each poor
working family, Cl . It can be shown
21 that under the sufficient condition that
121 1
2 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    sector 3 expands. So, we can have a situation where there are fewer
families each supplying a lower number of child workers. Therefore, the aggregate supply of
child labour falls at the cost of further impoverishment22 of the child labour supplying families.
This establishes the final proposition of the model.
Proposition 4: A price and/or a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture succeeds in
bringing down the prevalence of child labour in the society under the sufficient condition
that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    . However, each poor family becomes poorer due to this policy.
21
 Interested readers can easily check this after going through Appendices II and III.
22
 Note that bothW and CW fall due to the policy. Aggregate income of each family unequivocally
plummets as Cl falls too.
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5. Concluding remarks
In a developing country the government often tinkers with market mechanism using its tax and
subsidy policies for different purposes. It is a common belief that the backward agricultural sector
should be subsidized as poorer group of the working population are employed in this sector who
send their children out to work out of sheer poverty. If the economic conditions of these people
can be improved the social menace of child could automatically be mitigated. The analysis of this
paper has challenged this populist belief using a three-sector general equilibrium model with
child labour and agricultural dualism. The advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward
agriculture as follows. The former uses capital in the form of agricultural machineries that
prevents child labour to work on these farms. On the contrary, backward agriculture uses
primitive techniques of cultivation and employs child labour in a significant number. Apart from
this, backward agriculture uses more labour-intensive (adult labour) technique vis-à-vis advanced
agriculture with respect to land. In this backdrop we have examined the consequences of a price
subsidy policy designed to benefit backward agriculture on the aggregate supply of child labour
in the economy. We have found that fiscal policies that encourage backward agriculture sector are
likely to aggravate the child labour problem in the economy.  We have then proposed a couple of
alternative policies to deal with the child labour situation. We have advocated in favour of polices
that target the demand side of the problem. Our analysis has shown how an FDI led growth
strategy that encourages mechanized farming or incentive policies designed to benefit advanced
agriculture will be effective in reducing the gravity of the child labour incidence. However, the
analysis has suggested that the FDI led growth strategy is superior to subsidization policy to
advanced agriculture because the former policy unlike the latter does not lead to further
impoverishment of the child labour supplying families. The paper questions the desirability of
assisting backward agriculture from the view point of eradication of child labour and advocates in
favour of a more liberalized investment policy.
15
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Appendix I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour
Maximizing equation (8) with respect to 321 ,, CCC and Cl  and subject to the budget constraint
(9) the following first-order conditions are obtained.
))/()(())/()(())/()(())/()(( 332211 CC WlnUCPUCPUCPU                       (A.1)
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.
)}/()({ 11 PWlnC CC                                            (A.2)
)}/()({ 22 PWlnC CC                                                                                                     (A.3)
)}/()({ 33 PWlnC CC                                            (A.4)
Substitution of the values of 1C , 2C and 3C into the budget constraint and further simplifications
give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.
)}/(){( CC WWnl                                                                                             (10)
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in PS and K . In other
words, we have ˆ 0.r 
Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging
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1 2( ) 0;LL L LL L LLS S S   
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2[{ ( ) }( )L LC CC L N N L
C C
WS A S A
l W
        
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2{ ( ) }] 0N C LL K KL CL
C C
WS A S A S A
l W
      
                                                                                   (A.6)
2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2( ) 0K N L L N K L NA           
3 1
3 2 3 1 1 3 1
3 3
1 ( ) 0
1 1
L L
N L L N L L
L L
A            
12
1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNL        as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more
adult labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land both in
physical and value sense. The latter implies that 1 2 1 2( ) 0L N N L      which in turn shows that
0  .
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained.
2 2
2 1 2 1 1 2 3
1 1ˆˆ ˆ{ ( ) }L LC CC N P N C
C C
WW S A S A GS A K
l W
          (A.7)
           (─)            (+)         (─)          (+)      (+)       (─)          (+)
1 2
1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 3
1 1ˆˆ ˆ{ ( ) } ( )C LL K KL CL N P L N N L
C C
WW S A S A S A GS A K
l W
            (A.8)
          (─) (─)(+)             (+)           (+)         (+)      (+)       (─)            (─)         (+)
2 2
2 1 2 1 1 2 3
1 1ˆˆ ˆ{ ( ) }L LC CC L P L C
C C
WR S A S A GS A K
l W
                                                        (A.9)
       (─)           (+)          (─)          (+) (+)       (─)        (+)
Now subtraction of (A.8) from (A.7) yields
3





K N N K
L
A      
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2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 3 1
1 ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )]C L LC LL CC CL K KL N PW W A S S A S S S A GS        
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ{ ( )}N C L N N L A K       
Using the expression of LLS from (A.6) we can further simplify the expression of ˆ ˆ( )CW W as
follows.
1 1
1 1 1 3 1
1 ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ ]C L LL K KL N PW W A S S A GS     
                       (─) (+)   (─)               (+)       (+)
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ{ ( )}N C L N N L A K        (A.10)
                                                  (─)                            (─)            (+)
[Note that 2 2( ) 0CC CLS S   and 2 2( ) 0LL LCS S  , (note that as 2Na is constant 2 0CNS  and
2 0LNS  .]
Using (A.6), from (A.7) – (A.9) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results.
(i) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and ˆ 0CW  when ˆ 0PS  ;
(ii) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W   when ˆ 0PS 
(iii) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and ˆ 0CW  when ˆ 0K  ;            (A.11)
(iv) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W    when ˆ 0K 
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Appendix III: Changes in output composition
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s Rule we can derive the following expressions as well.
2 2 2 1
1 2 3 3 1 3
1ˆ [( ) ( )( )CL L LC K CC LL K K KL L
C C C C
W WX S S S S S
l W l W
          
2 13




L LC K KL N N P
L
S S GS     
2 23
2 2 3 2 1 2 1 2
3
1 [{ ( ) }( )(1 )
L




            
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1 2 2 3 2
3
ˆ{ ( ) }](1 )
L




       
Or,
2 1 1 2 13
1 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 2
3
1 ˆˆ [ ( )( ) )](1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N P
C C L
WX S S S S S GS
l W
              
                  (─)          (─)                 (─)                                                         (+)                    (+)
2
22
3 2 1 2 1 2
3
1 [{ ( )} ( )(1 )
L LC




           
                                   (─)      (+)               (─)                               (─)
2
1 2 3 2
3
ˆ{ ( )}](1 )
LL




       (A.12)
                                                                         (─)                   (+)
2 1 1 2 13
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 1
3
1 ˆˆ [ ( )( ) )](1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N P
C C L
WX S S S S S GS
l W
             
        (─)           (─)                (─)               (+)                                 (+)                        (+)
2
22
3 1 1 2 1 2
3
1 [{ ( )} ( )(1 )
L LC




           
                                         (─)      (+)        (─)                                  (─)
2
1 2 3 1
3
ˆ{ ( )}](1 )
LL




       (A.13)
                                                                                (─)                (+)
[We have used the expression of LLS  and note that
2 2 0LC LLS S   and 2 2 0CC CLS S  ]
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2 1 2 1
3 2 1 2 1 1
1ˆ [{( ) }CC L K KL L LC K KL N
C C
WX S S S S
l W
        
2 2 2 1
2 1 1 1 1 2 1
ˆ{( ) ( )( )} ]LC L LC K CC LL K L K KL N N P
C C C C
W WS S S S S GS
l W l W
           
2 2
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2




             
2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2




         
Or,
122 1 2 1 1
3 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 ˆˆ [ ( ){ }]L LC KL N CC KL N L LL K N PNL
C C
WX S S S S S GS
l W
           
(─)            (+)                     (─)              (+)                  (─)            (+)
2 2
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2




             
                        (─)        (+)                 (─)                        (+)  (─)
2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2




          (A.14)
                                             (─)                 (+)                      (+)
From (A.12) - (A.14) we get the following
(v) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when ˆ 0PS  ;
(vi) 3ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0PS 
(vii) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when ˆ 0K  ; (A.15)
under the sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S   
(viii) 3ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0K  .
Also note that 3 3ˆ ˆK X where 3 3 3KK a X  (this is because 3ˆ 0Ka  ). So,
(ix) 3ˆ 0K  when ˆ 0PS  ; and, (A.16)
(x) 3ˆ 0K  when ˆ 0K  .
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Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 3








WL W W X
l W

    
We now substitute the expressions of 3Xˆ   and ˆ ˆ( )CW W    from (A.14) and (A.10) respectively
to get the following expression.
1 1
1 1 1 3
1ˆ [ ( )C L LL K KL
C C
WL A S S A
l W
     
           (─)                        (─)               (+)
122 1 2 1 13
2 1 2 1 1
3
{ ( )( )} ](1 )
L
L LC KL N CC KL N L LL KNL
L C C
WS S S S S
l W
           1
ˆ
N PGS      (12)
                                          (+)                     (─)                 (+)                   (─)            (+)
From (12) we get the following results.
ˆ 0CL  when ˆ 0PS   under the sufficient condition 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S   
Rewriting (12) in a different way it can be checked that the above result also hold under the
sufficient condition that 2 1 2 1LC KL CC LLS S S S .
